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Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party? 
 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.1  
Shitong Qiao 2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
According to Albert O. Hirschman’s famous dichotomy, citizens can express their 
preferences with their “voice” (by voting with ballots to elect better representatives) and“exit” 
(by voting with their feet to choose better places to live).  Suppose, however, that ballot-voting is 
ineffective: Can exit not merely aid but also replace voice? Using as a case study the People’s 
Republic of China, a party state without elective democracy, we argue that exit is not a substitute 
for, but rather a complement to, voice.  China’s bureaucratic promotion system plays the role of 
local elections in the United States, promoting or replacing local officials based on their 
performance in office. In either regime, however, it is costly for local voters (in the United States) 
or the Chinese Communist Party (in China) to monitor and assess local officials.  Attention to 
foot-voting in the legal design of local government can help reduce these costs. By evaluating 
cadres who run the lower levels of China’s local governments on the basis of how successfully 
they attract mobile households, the central CCP authorities could reduce the costs of monitoring 
these local officials and thereby reproduce, by bureaucratic means, some of the benefits of 
electoral democracy.  Success in attracting foot-voters can be most cheaply measured by the 
Party’s evaluating cadres primarily on the basis of local land values which, because they are a 
product of foot-voters’ decisions about where to live, function like ballots insofar as they reflect 
the popularity of local cadres’ policy decisions with mobile Chinese households.  For foot-voting 
to improve governmental accountability, however, the Chinese system of local government law 
requires some basic but politically feasible reforms -- in particular, the introduction of a local 
property tax system, the creation of a federated city system that grants power and autonomy to 
sub-city units,  and the liberalization of China’s household registration system to make the 
population fully mobile across different jurisdictions.  
Contents	
I. 	 Lenin’s Nightmare: How can the Center Control the Cadres in a Regime of “Democratic 
Centralism”?	...................................................................................................................................	5	
A.  An Overview of Democratic Centralism’s Limits on Citizen “Voice”	.................................	6	
B.  How Democratic Centralism Weakens the Center	................................................................	8	
																																																						
1 William T. Comfort III Professor of Law, New York University Law School.   For their comments and discussions, 
the authors gratefully acknowledge Daryl Levinson, Robert Ellickson, Henry Hansmann, Zhang Taisu, Tian Lei, Ma 
Xiang, and Zhou Yucheng for related discussions.  The authors also thank Sun Weixiao, Hu Haifan , Ye Xiangwen, 
and Qi Yue for their excellent research assistance.  Shitong Qiao, acknowledges generous support from  the 
University of Hong Kong Seed Funding Programme for Basic Research (Project Code: 201411159056 ), and 
Roderick Hills acknowledges generous support from the Filomen D’Agostino Research Fund at NYU School of 
Law.  
2 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817652 
2 
	
II.  	 The Limits and Promise of Foot-Voting in Liberal Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes
	 12	
A. 	 The Fallacy of Simple Analogies Between Private Markets and Local Governments	...	14	
B.  	 Feedback and Foot-Voting: Electoral Voice and Bureaucratic Promotion as Necessary 
Complements to Exit-Based Control of Local Officials	...........................................................	16	
1.  	 The Homevoter Hypothesis as Feedback Mechanism Linking Ballot-Voters and Foot-
Voters	...................................................................................................................................	16	
2.  	 Cadre Promotion Criteria as the Feedback Mechanism Linking the CCP and Foot-
Voters: The Case of “Market-Preserving Federalism”	........................................................	17	
III. Using Land Values as the Best Proxy for Households’ Foot-Voting	.....................................	19	
A.  The Basic Defense of Land Values as the Best Proxy for Foot-Voters’ Choices	...............	19	
B.  Refinements and Qualifications	..........................................................................................	22	
1.  Henry George to the Rescue: Measuring land prices rather than real estate prices	.......	22	
2.  	 Comparing Apples to Apples: Measuring change in local governments’ land prices 
relative to land price change in the metropolitan area	........................................................	23	
3.  	 Avoiding short-term bubbles with medium-term land values and fiscal contraints	....	24	
4. Protecting Workers:  Qualifying land values with rent-income ratio (“RIR”)	................	25	
IV.  	 Foot-Voting with Chinese Characteristics:  Three Feasible Institutional Reforms to 
Improve Citizen Mobility	.............................................................................................................	27	
A. The Problem of Limited Fiscal Instruments	........................................................................	28	
1.  How Lack of Taxing Power Impedes Foot-Voting	...........................................................	28	
2. How to make a local property tax politically feasible	......................................................	30	
B.  The Problem of Excessive Size	...........................................................................................	33	
1.  Chinese Cities as Leviathans:  The Costs of Unified Metro Government	........................	33	
2. The Solution of the Federated City	...................................................................................	36	
C. Reforming Hukou to Facilitate Foot-Voting	........................................................................	38	
1.  The Obstacle of Hukou to Foot-Voting	............................................................................	38	
2.  Reforming the Hukou System through broader fiscal instruments and federative local 
governments	..........................................................................................................................	40	
Conclusion	....................................................................................................................................	43	
	
It is a familiar point that citizens can express their preferences either by voting with 
ballots or voting with their feet. When citizens vote with ballots, they collectively select policies 
or candidates governing the jurisdiction in which the voters reside.  When they vote with their 
feet, citizens individually migrate to jurisdictions governed by the migrants’ preferred policies or 
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officials. Using Albert O. Hirschman’s famous dichotomy, ballot-voting is described as the use 
of “voice,” while foot-voting is described as “exit.”3  But the two mechanisms might be seen as 
simply different mechanisms for individuals to make collective choices – with ballots, of people 
and policies; with feet, of places.   
The existence of these parallel mechanisms for revealing citizens’ preferences suggests 
that exit might be a substitute as well as a complement for voice.  Suppose that local elections 
are impractical or ineffective.  Could one achieve some or all of the accountability that such 
elections are intended to achieve simply by giving citizens the power to shop around for a local 
government that suits their desires?  Could foot-voting not merely aid but also replace ballot-
voting? 
The People’s Republic of China presents an opportunity to investigate this question of 
whether foot-voting can be a substitute for ballot-voting.  Although the ideology of the Chinese 
Communist Party (“CCP”) permits “intra-party democracy” (dangnei minzhu, 党内民主), actual 
voting on rival candidates even at the local level and even within the Communist Party is 
strikingly rare in China.4  In general, “cadres” – a term that, for the purposes of this article refers 
to CCP members seeking or holding public office – are assessed and promoted by the central 
CCP authorities without the intervention of any popular election.  The CCP’s ideology of 
democratic centralism, in other words, is more central than democratic, making any robust 
system of citizen voice difficult to install as long as the CCP is in power.   
At the same time, CCP leaders are aware of the need to anticipate and address public 
complaints about air pollution, corruption, access to jobs and education, police brutality, and 
other failures of governance.5  If there were an accurate way to measure public demand for 
various local public goods that did not pose a political risk to continued rule by the CCP, the 
CCP would have every reason to embrace the mechanism.  Foot-voting by mobile Chinese 
																																																						
3 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
STATES (1970). 
4 For brief summaries of the debate over the seriousness of intra-party democracy in China, see Joseph Fewsmith, 
Intra-Party Democracy:  Development and Limitations (Brookings Working Paper, 2016),  
http://archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Fewsmith_Inner-party_democracy.pdf  ; For a full-scale defense of intra-party 
democracy from an insider, see YU KEPING, DEMOCRACY IS A GOOD THING: ESSAYS ON POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND 
CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2009).  For a description of various efforts to hold township elections to 
decide on cadre promotions, see JOSEPH FEWSMITH, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA (2012). 
5 See e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 380 (2014); Bruce Gilley, Legitimacy and 
Institutional Change: the Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259 (2008); Stephen White, Economic Performance 
and Communist Legitimacy, 38 WORLD POLITICS 462 (1986).  
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citizens might be precisely such a mechanism by which (to borrow Yu Keping’s phrase) 
democracy might be made safe for the Communist Party.6  
We provide some cautiously optimistic arguments in favor of promoting exit as a way to 
improve accountability of local officials to Chinese citizens.  The basic idea is that the CCP 
cadres who run the lower levels of China’s local governments – in particular, the urban districts 
and counties rather than the provinces and prefectural-level cities – could be evaluated based on 
how successfully they compete with each other for mobile households choosing a jurisdiction in 
which to live.  Such success would theoretically be reflected in the price of land, a price that 
would reflect (“capitalize”) local cadres’ decisions about regulations, expenditures, and revenue-
raising.  Through the magic of such capitalization, central Party officials could evaluate which 
cadres were really enhancing social welfare by satisfying their citizens’ preferences for public 
goods and which were instead wasting money on showy “face projects”7 and pollution-
generating industry the costs of which exceeds the benefits.   In effect, foot-voting could 
instigate competition among cadres for migrants to bid up the value of their jurisdiction’s land by 
attracting the “votes” of foot-voters, a competition that might be a form of “intra-party 
democracy” (or, at least, intra-party competition) safe enough for the CCP to adopt.   
We caution that our defense of exit is contingent on the CCP’s adoption of some 
incentive system to give local cadres proper incentives and tools for competing  with each other 
for mobile households.   At the most general theoretical level, exit cannot be a substitute for 
voice unless some mechanism gives subnational officials an incentive to care about attracting 
mobile citizens.  In liberal democracies, local elections provide such a mechanism.  In a Leninist 
system of democratic centralism, the official criteria for bureaucratic promotion play the role of 
elections.  Rather than focusing on local GDP, local job creation, or local revenue generation, 
central CCP authorities ought to focus on local land prices, promoting cadres who improve the 
value of land by attracting more buyers.  To facilitate citizens’ foot-voting and inter-
jurisdictional competition, we urge the introduction of a property tax system in Chinese cities, a 
system which could become the monetary voice of China’s mobile citizenry.  We also urge the 
																																																						
6 See Yu Keping (俞可平), 政治改革的合理路径 [A Plausible Approach to Political Reform], CHINA IN 
PERSPECTIVE (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=14389.  
7 In Chinese, “face projects” or “mianzi gongcheng” (面子工程) refer to infrastructure that is showy but not useful. 
See e.g., 面子工程触目惊心，有多少浪费可以重来 [How Much Could We Waste On Face Projects], 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/by18.htm (last visited August 2, 2016).  
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building of a federated city system that grants power and autonomy to sub-city units of proper 
size,  and we recommend the further reform of China’s household registration (hukou, 户口) 
system to make population fully mobile among different jurisdictions.   
Beyond these specific suggestions for reform in China, this article also suggests a 
relationship between exit and voice in which each is not a substitute for, but rather a complement 
to, the other.  Without voice, or a mechanism analogous to voice like bureaucratic promotion 
criteria, exit cannot function well as a system of accountability to mobile households, because 
subnational officials, angling for promotion, have no reason a priori to care about maximizing 
the value of local real estate.   Our specific suggested reforms are an effort to enlist the CCP’s 
bureaucratic promotion system to do the work that citizen voice performs in the United States 
and other liberal democracies.  Whether that bureaucratic promotion system can bear such 
weight is an open question.  We provide only an abstract theoretical case that foot-voting can be 
made safe for the CCP if the CCP makes Chinese local governments responsive to foot-voters.  
Here is a brief roadmap of our argument. Part I addresses the paradoxical nature of the 
CCP’s democratic centralism, a fundamental principle of the Chinese party state. Part II 
compares foot-voting in liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes and argues that 
bureaucratic promotion criteria in China are the necessary complement to exit-based control of 
local officials just as local elections are necessary for foot-voting in the United States. Part III 
proposes using land values as the main criterion in the CCP’s cadre evaluation, because they are 
best proxy for foot-voter’s choices. Part IV defends three feasible institutional reforms, namely 
property tax, federated cities, and household registration (hukou, 户口) reform, to improve 
government accountability through citizen mobility in China.  
I.  Lenin’s Nightmare: How can the Center Control the Cadres in a Regime of 
“Democratic Centralism”?  
 
The benefits of exit depend on the costs of voice.  If voters, aided by a vigorous press and 
competitive political parties, could easily choose officials who would truly enact those voters’ 
preferred policies, then the relative benefits of facilitating citizen choice through migration 
would be reduced.  Why rely on citizen mobility when electoral accountability can accomplish 
the same end without the hassle of migration?  The answer is that sometimes there are 
impediments to effective voice.  Local voters, for instance, might be rationally ignorant about 
political decisions that their vote has a minuscule chance of affecting and, therefore, be apathetic 
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or ignorant in casting their ballots.  Local governments might also be dominated by a single 
political party or interest that suppresses genuine electoral choices. Confronted by such 
impediments to effective voice, one might try instead to elicit popular preferences through exit.  
In China, citizens can use both voice and exit to control the government, but access to both is 
limited by ideological and legal constraints. We will discuss the institutional limits on exit in Part 
IV.  Here, we describe both the power of, and limits on, citizens’ voice under the principle of 
“democratic centralism.”  Those limits on citizen voice can be a substantial impediment to the 
CCP’s effective monitoring and control of its cadres, suggesting a need for voice to be 
supplemented by exit.     
A.  An Overview of Democratic Centralism’s Limits on Citizen “Voice” 
 
At the heart of the CCP’s ideology is a contradictory attitude towards popular 
participation in government, captured by the phrase “democratic centralism” (minzhu jizhong zhi
民主集中制).  Promoted by Lenin as a principle for governing the Bolshevik Party and 
eventually the Soviet state, democratic centralism has also been adopted as a governing principle 
of the CCP.8  Democratic centralism suggests a contradiction, because it simultaneously 
encourages and limits popular criticism of the government.9  On one hand, the idea of socialist 
democracy requires the CCP to “connect to the people closely”  by keeping a close eye on 
popular opinion, soliciting popular views about the government’s performance and responding to 
those views in the CCP’s policy decisions. On the other hand, the actual governmental decisions 
must be “centralized,” meaning that they must be made by the Party leadership, not by the people 
themselves or their elected representatives.  Mao’s description of democratic centralism as 
																																																						
8On the origins of democratic centralism in the Bolshevik Party, see  MICHAEL WALLER, DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM: 
AN HISTORICAL COMMENTARY 31-32 (1981). Lenin provided his original statement of democratic centralism in 
Vladimir Lenin, Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action, in VLADIMIR LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS 442, 442-43 
(1965), available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/20c.htm; see also Vladimir Lenin, 
Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906), available at 
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Russia/BOOKS/Lenin/The%20Congress%20Summed%20Up%201906%20%
20Lenin.pdf.  He faced considerable  internal and international opposition to his principle of democratic centralism, 
with Rosa Luxemburg’s 1904 article being the most eloquent and well-known example.  See Rosa Luxemburg, 
Organizational Questions of the Russian Social Democracy (1904), available at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1904/questions-rsd/ .  On the adoption of democratic centralism by the 
CCP in 1927, see Stephen C. Angle, Decent Democratic Centralism, 33 POL. THEORY 518, 524-25 (2005), citing 
ANTHONY SAICH, THE RISE TO POWER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 259, 806 
(1996). 
9For a succinct account of the tensions implicit in the idea of democratic centralism, see Gang Lin, Leadership 
Transition, Intra-Party Democracy, and Institution Building in China, 44 ASIAN SURVEY, 255, 273 (2004).	
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“contradictory parts of an integrated principle” suggests the delicate balancing act that these two 
ideas require.10  The Party listens to popular opinion in formulating policy,11  but it is the Party, 
not majority voting by the people, that makes the ultimate decision based on popular input.  
This idea of democratic centralism explains what to an outside observer can seem like a 
perplexing contradiction.  On one hand, public debate in China is not merely outspoken but 
raucous.  On the other, any effort to engage in collective action or social mobilization outside of 
the CCP is quickly and sometimes brutally suppressed.  Consider, for instance, Chinese 
regulation of online speech here. With the rise of the Internet and new media platforms, more 
than 1.3 billion people can now broadcast their individual views.12 Far from trying to eliminate 
such on-line discussions, the CCP has tolerated or even actively encouraged them,13 For instance, 
by having governmental agencies set up their own Weibo accounts to publicize information, lead 
discussions, and facilitate citizen reports of cadres’ unethical behavior.14 As soon as on-line 
discussants suggest or assist in collective action, however, they are quickly censored.15   
																																																						
10Mao Zedong, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, in SELECTED READINGS FROM THE 
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 432 (1971)  
11张慕良, <民主和集中的主从关系是怎样形成的> (Zhang Muliang, How Did the Subsidiary Relationship 
between Democracy and Centralization Form?), 学习时报(STUDY TIMES) 2010年 10月 19日, available at 
http://www.chinaelections.com/article/196/189241.html (last visited July 22, 2016)   
12 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but 
Silences Collective Expression, 107 AM.  POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2013).  
13 See e.g., Ya-Wen Lei & Daniel Xiaodan Zhou, Contesting Legality in Authoritarian Contexts: Food Safety, Rule 
of Law and China's Networked Public Sphere, 49 L. & Soc’y Rev. 557 (2015).  
14 See e.g., Architecture of Social Management: From E-Gov and Gov Weibo to Gov WeChat, China US Focus (Sep. 
4, 2015), http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/architecture-of-social-management-from-e-
gov-and-gov-weibo-to-gov-wechat/;  Angela Meng, Beijing Still Struggles to Make Voice Heard Through Sina 
Weibo, South China Morning Post (Mar. 03, 2014, 4:38 am), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1438896/beijing-still-struggles-make-voice-heard-through-sina-weibo;  
Min Jiang & Jesper Schlæger, How Weibo Is Changing Local Governance in China, The Diplomat (Aug 06, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/how-weibo-is-changing-local-governance-in-china/.  On the use of the internet to 
facilitate citizen complaints, see the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China 
(“CCDI”) Supervision Bureau Reporting Website: http://www.12388.gov.cn/.  See also 我举报的问题查处了吗？”
中纪委：件件有着落  [Any Result of the Case I reported?” CCP Committee of Discipline: Following Every Case!], 
Xinhua (Feb. 4, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-02/04/c_128702525.htm; 中紀委"四風"監督舉報平
台背后故事：每個線索都有專人處置 [The Story Behind CCDI “Four Trends” Supervision and Reporting 
Platform: Every Lead has Been Assigned an Agent to Handle], People (Feb. 05, 2016), 
http://fanfu.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/0205/c64371-28112734.html. 
15 See Gary King, Jennifer Pan, & Margaret E. Roberts, Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China: Randomized 
Experimentation and Participant Observation, Science (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/345/6199/1251722; Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts, How 
Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, 107 Am. Political. Sci. Rev. 
1, 14-15 (2013) (using  statistical analysis of the public’s online commentary to show that, “[c]ontrary to previous 
understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more 
8 
	
A similar distinction seems to guide the CCP’s treatment of protests outside of 
cyberspace.  Chinese citizens regularly and effectively engage in “mass incidents” to protest 
what they regard as corrupt or harmful governmental policies.16  Consider, for instance, the 
protests of thousands of Chinese residents in 2011 against the siting of paraxylene (“PX”) 
factories near to their residences and businesses.  Riot police largely left the protestors alone, and 
local officials mollified them with conciliatory speeches  -- suffering heckling from the crowds 
for their pains.17  While tolerating such “mass incidents,” the CCP has arrested human rights 
lawyers, labor activists, and feminists who file lawsuits or organize protests in the name of 
universal human rights.18  To petition the CCP for a redress of personal grievances, even angrily, 
does not offend the idea of “centralism” (jizhongzhi, 集中制).	 To organize a public lawsuit or 
demonstration to vindicate the abstract values of human rights or feminism, by contrast, is a 
direct challenge to the primacy of the CCP over public policy.	    	
B.  How Democratic Centralism Weakens the Center 
	
From the viewpoint of the CCP, these limits on citizens’ voice can impose substantial 
costs on China’s governance.  By excluding the more institutionalized forms of public input such 
as lawsuits before independent courts, op-eds from an independent press, or competitive 
elections of representatives, the “centralizing” side of democratic centralism weakens the 
constraints on the CCP’s cadres, allowing them secretly to defy CCP policies, because neither 
the CCP leadership nor the disorganized and extra-institutional public is capable of monitoring 
																																																																																																																																																																														
likely to be censored” but that “censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments 
that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content”). 
16 See e.g., Kevin J. O’Brien, Rightful Resistance, 49 WORLD POLITICS 31 (1996); Tong Yanqi & Lei, Large-Scale 
Mass Incidents and Government Responses in China, 1 INT’L J. CHINA STUD. 487  (2010). 
17 See Jonathan Watts, Tens of Thousands Protest Against Chemical Plant in Northern China, The Guardian (Aug. 
14, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/14/china-protest-against-px-chemical-plant .   
18	See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html?_r=0 ; Sui-Lee 
Wee, China Arrests Four Labor Activists Amist Crackdown: Lawyers, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-idUSKCN0UO05M20160110 ; Andrew Jacabos, Taking Feminist 
Battle to China’s Streets, and Landing in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/asia/chinese-womens-rights-activists-fall-afoul-of-officials.html . 
Didi Kirsten Tatlow, In China, Relatives Await Word on Detained Rights Lawyers After a Year, N.Y.Times (July 8th, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/world/asia/china-human-rights-lawyers.html  
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officials in China’s tens of thousands of subprovincial governments.19  In this respect, 
democratic centralism faces a paradoxical dilemma:  The more that the CCP excludes private 
citizens from a formal and institutionalized role in controlling local cadres in the name of 
centralism, the more that local cadres will become a law unto themselves, secretly defying the 
leadership and thereby undermining the very centralism that the CCP sought to advance through 
tight control of public debate.20   
The CCP’s need for assistance in monitoring its local agents is not unique to China. It is a 
familiar problem of agency costs that afflict all large organizations, including congressional 
supervision of the bureaucracy in the United States. The problem arises from the informational 
advantages enjoyed by the bureaucracy implementing the central government’s general programs 
that will typically know much more about the real costs and benefits of the programs they 
implement, precisely because they implement them. 21   
The challenge of supervising local officials pose a dilemma for the CCP’s central 
authorities in which simplicity of evaluation criteria competes with such criteria’s completeness.  
Too little information leads to administrative simplicity but also to promotions unrelated to cadre 
success in promoting citizen welfare.  Too much information, however, creates opportunities for 
factions to manipulate the evaluation criteria to favor their own members.      
Consider, first, the lemma of over-simplified criteria.  The CCP’s  reliance on GDP growth as 
the major criterion for evaluating local leaders provides an example of the costs of clear but 
crude markers of cadre success.22 GDP growth is easy to measure and clearly visible to 
																																																						
19China has 41,636 township-level governments, 2,862  county-level units,  333 prefecture-level units, and 31 
provincial-level units.   Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development, 49  J. 
ECON. LIT. 1076 (2011) (data from 2006)   
20	For  rich descriptions of this dilemma relating successful cadre evaluation to rule of law, see Murray Scot Tanner 
& Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to 
“Rule of Law” in China, 191 CHINA Q.  644 (2007); Carl F. Minzer,  Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive 
Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 53 (2009);  	
21For classic accounts of the costs faced by Congress in monitoring the bureaucracy in the United States, see, e.g., 
LAWRENCE C.DODD & RICHARD L.SCHOTT,CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 170–73 (1979); James Q. 
Wilson, The Politics of Regulation in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 388 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) . 
For a discussion of oversight in different political systems, see SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF 
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 57 (1993).  As in the United States, informational obstacles to oversight in China can 
take the form of goal displacement (local bureaucracy implementing the “letter” but not the “spirit” of the central 
policy) or data falsification.  See Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and 
Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. L. REV. 365, 412 (2013). 
22 GDP has indeed been the primary criteria for cadre promotion since the 1990s. The unspoken rule is that if one 
does well on the economy, one has the prospect of becoming a central ministry official or joining the Politburo. See 
e, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. L. REV. 365, 
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supervising officials but also unrelated to social costs that do not affect economic productivity, 
including social and environmental costs like traffic jams, air pollution, loss of historic buildings, 
and destruction of socially cohesive neighborhoods.23 The perverse incentives created by 
promoting cadres on the basis of local GDP is illustrated by the problem of so-called “ghost 
cities” – often enormous real estate developments promoted by local government officials but 
inhabited by virtually no residents.  The famous ghost city Ordos in inner Mongolia presents a 
classic case.24  One  party secretary expanded the city boundary and built a lot of roads to the 
otherwise empty Kangbashi section of the jurisdiction and got promoted into the provincial-level 
inner Mongolia government.  He was succeeded by a second party secretary who built a lot of 
skyscrapers and also got promoted. A couple of years after the development had been completed, 
it stood empty, and the third Party Secretary was stuck with the ghost city, to which no residents 
wanted to move.25  In short, perverse promotion criteria seems to have induced the local Party 
leadership to inflate a temporary real estate bubble, creating construction jobs and GDP figures 
that they could tout as a basis for their promotion, passing on a  real estate bomb to their hapless 
successor.  
The problem of over-simplified and incomplete promotion criteria is not unique to the focus 
on GDP:  Any “hard” numerical target will tend to squeeze out consideration of vaguer, less 
easily measurable  criteria.26  As a response to the “hard” target of energy usage reduction in the 
																																																																																																																																																																														
388 (2013) (quoting a central government official in stating that “[e]veryone sees this and knows the deal [that GDP 
is key]”).  
23 For a similar suggestion, see “Grossly  Deceptive Plans,” The Economist, January 30th, 2016, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21689628-chinas-obsession-gdp-targets-threatens-its-economy-grossly-
deceptive-plans .  On the invisibility of environmental measures in a GDP-centered system, see See Alex Wang, The 
Search for Sustainable Legitimacy, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. at 388 (quoting a central government official in stating 
that “[i] the past, if you spent a lot of money and effort on a wastewater treatment plant, the center would not see it 
(“中央看不见，zhongyang kan bu jian”)).   
24Jody Rosen, The Colossal Strangeness of China’s Most Excellent Tourist City, N.Y. TIMES, (March 6th, 2015),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/t-magazine/ordos-china-tourist-city.html  
25 Conversation with a Chinese economist who consulted with the Ordos government and whose name needs to be 
kept annoymous, November 19, 2014.  For a stark photo portrait of Ordos, see Michael Christopher Brown, Ordos, 
China:  A Modern Ghost Town, TIME MAGAZINE, 
http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1975397,00.html  For a less negative assessment, see Eli Bildner, 
Ordos: A Ghost Town That Isn't, THE ATLANTIC (April 8th, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/ordos-a-ghost-town-that-isnt/274776/ (interviewing filmmaker 
about Ordos documentary showing “how optimistic people are there, and how hopeful they are”). 
26	See, e.g.,	Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China, 31 COMP. POLITICS, 
167, 173-74 (1999) (because of the difficulty in formulating measurable targets and lack of grass-root participation, 
local cadres have selectively implemented unpopular policies such as collecting taxes and enforcing birth control 
over nonquantifiable goals such as employing a democratic work style and respecting villagers’ rights).	
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Eleventh Five-Year Plan, for instance, local governments across the country deliberately 
imposed power outages, denying electricity even to hospitals, schools, traffic lights, and homes.  
These outages prompted private enterprises to use small-scale diesel fuel generators that defeated 
the pollution-reducing purpose of the hard target.27   
Switching to the other lemma of more complex and contradictory evaluation criteria, 
however, does not solve the problem of information costs.  The 2009 Experimental Regulation of 
the CCP Central Organization Department on the Evaluation of Local Leaders and Cadres 28 
contain many contradictory goals that  merely replace the problem  of incompleteness with 
opacity.  Contradictory criteria – say, environmental quality and job growth – are so 
indeterminate as to be uninformative, inviting each faction in the leadership to promote political 
allies rather than the truly more successful or qualified cadres.29 The identity of the evaluator’s 
faction and the loyalty of the evaluated cadres to their patron then can play an important, 
sometimes more important, role than actual cadre performance.30     
Democratic centralism reduces the capacity of the CCP to overcome this dilemma of 
information costs, by reducing citizens’ effective monitoring of local officials.31    Local 
residents have immediate self-interest in efficient infrastructure, cleaner air, honest government, 
and other local public goods.  Their organized, institutional resistance to local cadres could act as 
“fire alarms,” in McCubbins’ and Schwartz’s familiar phrase, allowing central authorities to 
economize on their monitoring efforts by focusing on those local jurisdictions where there is a 
																																																						
27 See Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy,  37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. at 421-22.  
28中组部印发实施地方领导班子和干部考核试行办法  [The CCP Organization Department Promulgated 
Implemenation Regulations on the Evaluation of Local Leaders and Cadres], 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/4567774.html  The 2009 regulation evaluated cadres based on their success 
in promoting scientific development, including not only GDP but also education, health care, social safety, cultural 
activities; and sustainable development, carbon emission reduction, environmental protection; and improvement of 
living standards, and living environment, transportation.   
29 See Charles N. Halaby, Bureaucratic Promotion Criteria, 23 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 466, 468 (1978)(discretionary 
criteria place control of career opportunities in the hands of administrative officials). 
30 Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, & Ming Xingliu, Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the 
Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166 (2012).  For argument and data 
suggesting that patronage plays a more ambiguous role in cadres’ careers, see Jinghan Zeng, What Matters Most in 
Selecting top Chinese Leaders?  A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,18 J. CHIN. POL. SCI. 223 (2013), available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html?id=56b018c05e9d9700a48b4575&assetKey=AS%3A324512
594235392%401454381239176  
31	See Huang Yanzhong, The State of China’s State Apparatus, 28 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 31, 47 (2004) (lower-level 
officials can fool higher authorities more easily than their counterparts in liberal democracies because of the lack of 
oversight from citizens).	
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higher risk that local cadres are under-performing.32  The CCP recognizes the advantages of 
citizens’ assistance in governance, making use of devices like “democratic appraisal meetings”  
(minzhu pingyi, 民主评议) in which lower-level cadres anonymously evaluate their superiors as 
a complement to the usual top-down evaluations.33  Democratic centralism, however, weakens 
these popular controls by limiting the degree to which citizens can organize institutions for 
independent collective action.  Providing unstructured venues for individual citizen complaints – 
for instance, “appraisal meetings,” websites through which lone individuals can report local 
corruption, or a bureau of letters of complaints34 (guojia xinfang ju, 国家信访局)  -- is no 
substitute for private organizations like newspapers, unions, and organized interest groups.  Such 
civil-society organizations can shoulder the costs of acquiring legal, accounting, and economic 
expertise and overcome “free rider” problems of public action that isolated individuals cannot or 
will not bear.35   
The CCP’s suspicion of such an institutionalized, collective role for private citizens in the 
name of democratic centralism, therefore, is actually decentralizing, not centralizing, because 
such suspicion empowers local cadres at the expense of the central CCP.  In this sense, 
democratic centralism is literally self-defeating if it excludes all institutionalized and organized 
input from the public, demanding citizen passivity or merely individual complaints and petitions 
rather than active collective engagement. 
II.   The Limits and Promise of Foot-Voting in Liberal Democratic and Authoritarian 
Regimes 
  
If citizen voice is muted by democratic centralism, why not rely on citizen exit? Both voice 
and exit, after all, are means by which citizens can select the local officials who govern them. 
Could foot-voting, therefore, make up for the limits on ballot-voting in China?  
																																																						
32	Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire 
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171-76 (1984). 
33	See Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective, 
173 CHINA Q. 35, 42-43 (2004) (evaluating the cadre management system and arguing that the Chinese party-state 
has the capacity to be selectively effective in implementing its priority policies)	
34	On the Chinese tradition of “letters and calls” by which individual citizens can petition for redress of grievances, 
see Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 176-77 
(2006).	
35	For the classic account of the costs of collective action, see, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1965).  For an account of how private interest groups overcome such collective action problems, see, e.g., 
LAWRENCE ROTHENBERG, LINKING CITIZENS TO GOVERNMENT: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AT COMMON CAUSE 
(1992) 
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 As we explain below, exit cannot be a substitute for voice, but it can be a supplement. It is a 
fallacy to assume that local officials somehow naturally seek to enlarge their tax revenue or any 
other resources that such migration might produce.36   The “market” for local governments, 
therefore, cannot arise unless some specific mechanism exists to make local officials care about 
attracting foot-voters.  Incentives to care about foot-voters ordinarily take the form of some sort 
of “voice” – that is, some mechanism by which local officials’ superiors (either local voters or 
bureaucratic superiors) self-consciously supervise, reprimand, promote, or demote local officials.  
In this sense, the efficacy of exit is always dependent the efficacy of voice that commands local 
officials to care about whether their communities are attractive to migrants.  
The absence of local elections does not mean that Chinese local officials can never have 
incentives to cater to foot-voters. We suggest that China’s criteria for bureaucratic promotion can 
be enlisted to induce local cadres to care about households’ foot-voting just as local elections are 
used in the United States to force politicians to campaign on boosting home values.   Our 
argument hinges on an analogy between what William Fischel has called “homevoters” – that is, 
the property-owning electorate of a local government in the United States -- and the CCP’s 
bureaucratic evaluators of cadre performance.  In liberal democracies, homevoters vote against 
locally elected officials who do not enact policies attractive to homebuyers.  This electoral link 
induces local politicians to care about making their jurisdiction attractive to homebuyers.  In 
China’s system of democratic centralism, the central authorities can play the role of homevoters 
by withholding promotion from local cadres who fail to make their jurisdiction attractive to 
Chinese households.   As the example of market-preserving federalism suggests, if local cadres 
are evaluated by how effectively they attract private investors into their jurisdictions, then cadres 
will pay close attention to the interests of those investors.   
We will defer until Part III our exposition and defense of a cadre evaluation system rooted in 
the value of local land, the criterion that we take to be the most faithful measure of success in 
attracting foot-voters.  In this section we make the more basic case that citizen exit can help fix 
shortcomings of citizen voice only if the authoritarian analogue to local elections – bureaucratic 
promotion -- is revised to make exit relevant to local leaders.    
 
																																																						
36 On the dangers of analogies between public and private organizations that ignore their differing incentives, see 
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs,  67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000) (“But government does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm”). 
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A.  The Fallacy of Simple Analogies Between Private Markets and Local Governments  
 
At least since the work of Charles Tiebout was introduced into the legal academy in the late 
1970s, it has become commonplace for legal scholarship to analogize local governments to 
private firms that market public goods to “citizen-consumers.”37   On this view,foot-voting 
citizens shop among local governmental “firms” looking for the best mix of price and quality in 
governmental services.  Local officials cater to these mobile “citizen-consumers,” because those 
officials want to maximize the value of local real estate.    
This firm-government analogy is flawed, because it ignores the need for some feedback 
mechanism to induce local officials to care about attracting foot-voters.  Those officials, after all, 
are not owners of the real estate, entitled to appropriate the gains in value from attracting buyers.  
Moreover, powerful ideological constraints in both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes 
like the CCP’s China prevent such officials from simply being transformed into real estate 
developers with rights to appropriate such gains in real estate values for personal use.  Absent 
such personal incentives, however, why should one assume that local officials will care about 
attracting foot-voters?    Foot-voters would be effectively “voting” for officials who did not care 
about winning the “election.”  For such migrants, exiting one badly governed jurisdiction in 
favor of another would be a trip from the frying pan into the fire:  Indifferent to whether their 
communities grew or shrunk, officials would have  no reason to be honest or competent as a way 
to attract migrants. 
The fallacy of arguing that citizen mobility can be a substitute for defective voice is 
illustrated by Professor Ilya Somin’s argument that citizen mobility can be a cure for voter 
ignorance.  Professor Somin reasons that, because citizens who vote with their feet reap all of the 
gains from their migration, they avoid the well-known incentives for rational ignorance about 
																																																						
37 Charles Tiebout’s seminal article, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) did not 
have much impact on economic scholarship until Wallace Oates demonstrated that Tiebout’s theoretical mechanism 
of citizen mobility had the practical effect of causing the price of land to reflect the quality and tax price of local 
public goods.   Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An 
Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969).  It took another 
decade for Tiebout’s ideas to penetrate legal scholarship.  For a brief history of Tiebout’s influence in legal 
scholarship, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to What?  Tiebout and the Comparative Merits of Congress and 
the States in Constitutional Federalism, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR 
OF WALLACE OATES 239 (William A. Fischel, ed., Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2006).  For a survey of 
Tiebout’s influence on economists, see Wallace Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model in  THE TIEBOUT 
MODEL AT FIFTY at 21-33. 
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politics that afflict ballot-voting.38  The difficulty with Professor Somin’s theory is that, in 
denigrating citizens’ capacity for intelligent exercise of the franchise, he has also undercut the 
incentives for local officials to care about attracting migrants.  Even if there is high demand 
among such migrants for honest and competent governance, why would any politician care about 
meeting this demand?   By Professor Somin’s own hypothesis, voters are rationally ignorant 
about those politicians’ success in boosting local property values.  If the local governments do 
not care about the migrants, then why should the migrants invest much effort in comparison 
shopping among the local governments?    Professor Somin assumes that local governments 
compete with each other for migrants, because “[s]tates and localities seek to attract new 
residents and businesses as sources of tax revenue,” but his argument that voters are 
irredeemably ignorant about politics undercuts this assertion about subnational politicians’ 
incentives.39  If voters do not pay attention to politics, then why should canny politicians care 
about gaining tax revenue?  As Albert Hirschman noted, local officials governing a passive 
population might actually want to deter immigration of a more demanding lot of citizens.40  If 
ease of exit rids an organization of pesky squeaky wheels while leaving the more quiescent 
members in place, then the organization managers will encourage exit and provide low-quality 
services to the passive citizenry who are left behind.41  The electoral incentive, therefore, might 
actually create incentives for local officials to reduce the attractiveness of their communities and 
thereby drive away potential political opponents, such as members of a different ethnic group.42   
Professor Somin’s theory of local governments’ competing for a mobile populace, in short, 
depends on a theory of informed local voters that the rest of his book rejects.   In this respect, 
Professor Somin’s theory of exit is similar to more formal economic models.  Like Professor 
Somin, early exit-based theories of local government simply assumed away the problem of a 
feedback mechanism through which local officials would have incentives to attract the optimal 
																																																						
38 See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE:  WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 137 (2d ed.  
2013). 
39 Id. at 145.  
40  See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES 124 (1970) (“[M]anagement will,” Hirschman argued, “strain to strip the members-customers of the 
weapons which they can wield, be they exit or voice, and to convert, as it were, what should be a feedback into a 
safety valve.”).  
41 Consider, as an example of such an argument, the common complaint that “school choice” undermines public 
schools’ quality by making it easy for the most vocal parents to leave, depriving the parents who stay behind of 
political clout and sophistication.  See James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259 (1991). 
42 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate, 21 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 1 (2005). 
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number of migrants.  Charles Tiebout’s landmark article, A Pure Theory of Local Public 
Expenditures, 43 for instance, provided a model under which, by moving to a particular 
jurisdiction, migrants reveal that they value the services provided by the jurisdiction at the 
jurisdiction’s average cost of providing those services.  The model explicitly rested on the 
assumption that the local managers sought to maximize the value of local real estate by 
maintaining the community at its optimal size “to lower average costs” of providing local 
goods.44  Economists building on Tiebout’s model maintained this assumption without defending 
it, essentially assuming that mayors were ipso facto entrepreneurial real estate developers 
seeking to get the highest return on land sales.45 But local officials are emphatically not real 
estate developers:  Unless they are corrupt, they derive no automatic benefit from appreciating 
land prices, and they might very well be disadvantaged by the arrival of nosy, vocal homebuyers 
into their jurisdiction.  Why, then, should they try to make their jurisdictions appealing to these 
foot-voting migrants?   
B.   Feedback and Foot-Voting: Electoral Voice and Bureaucratic Promotion as 
Necessary Complements to Exit-Based Control of Local Officials    
 
Theories of exit, in short, require some mechanism aside from the threat of exit itself to 
motivate local officials.  In liberal democracies, that mechanism is the ballot: Local officials care 
about maximizing local property values, because local voters punish them when home prices go 
down.  In authoritarian regimes, the necessary mechanism is bureaucratic promotion by CCP 
superiors. What reason is there to believe that either voters or CCP superiors are either willing or 
able to enforce their criteria for promotion and demotion against local officials?    
1.   The Homevoter Hypothesis as Feedback Mechanism Linking Ballot-Voters and Foot-
Voters   
	
Consider, as an example of such an amalgamation of exit and  voice in liberal democracy, 
William Fischel’s influential “homevoters hypothesis,” in which local voters’ inability to exit 
forces them to participate effectively and intelligently in politics.  “Homevoters,” in Fischel’s 
																																																						
43 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, supra note 37.  
44 Id. at 420 (“The last assumption is that communities below the optimum size seek to attract new residents to lower 
average costs. Those above optimum size do just the opposite. Those at an optimum try to keep their populations 
constant”). 
45 See, e.g., J.C. Sonstelie & P.R. Portney, Profit Maximizing Communities and the Theory of Local Public 
Expenditure, 5 J. URB. ECON. 263 (1978). 
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lexicon, are simply local residents who are held hostage to their local government’s decisions 
affecting local real estate’s value, because they purchased that real estate before the decision was 
made. Because homebuyers will take into account the predicted effect of those decisions when 
making their bid, homevoters cannot escape the value-lowering decisions of incumbent 
politicians by selling their land.  They must stand and fight – and they fight hard, overcoming the 
ignorance about politics that normally affects their ballots, because a huge and uninsurable 
portion of their assets are tied up in their land investment, making such ignorance less rational.46   
Because homebuyers pay more for low taxes, value-enhancing zoning regulations, and high-
quality (mostly educational) services, the value of the political decisions creating such conditions 
will be “capitalized” into the value of the homes that homevoters have purchased, giving every 
homevoter an incentive to show up at planning commission hearings and city council meetings 
even if they do not have kids in school.  Under Fischel’s model, in other words, local politics 
(“voice”) depends on a combination of homebuyers’ freedom of movement (“exit”) and 
homevoters’ lack of exit. The former gives local voters information about how local decisions 
affect net welfare.  The latter gives local voters incentive to pay attention to this information. 
2.   Cadre Promotion Criteria as the Feedback Mechanism Linking the CCP and Foot-
Voters: The Case of “Market-Preserving Federalism” 
 
What analogous mechanism provides feedback in authoritarian systems, where local officials 
are not responsible to local homevoters through elections?    One mechanism is bureaucratic 
promotion criteria.  To the extent that an official’s chance of promotion is enhanced by the 
official’s attracting migrants to his or her jurisdiction, that official will have incentives to cater to 
foot voters just as much as if the migrants actually enjoyed the ballot, for the foot-voting 
migrants would hold the fate of the official in their collective hands.   In effect, the central CCP 
authorities would play the role of homevoters in Fischel’s system, judging the performance of 
local cadres by their proficiency in attracting homebuyers.   
Would local cadres really cater to foot-voting households if the criteria for promotion in 
China’s cadre evaluation system (ganbu kaohe zhidu,干部考核制度) were more closely tailored 
to cadres’ proficiency in attracting homebuyers?     Just as local voters might be indifferent to 
local elections, so too, CCP superiors in Beijing might be indifferent to official promotion 
																																																						
46 See WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 39-72 (2001). 
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criteria, relying instead on personal ties and factional loyalties between local officials and CCP 
leaders.47   On the other hand, it is also possible that central authorities might care about official 
promotion criteria at the middle levels of subnational government such as prefecture-level cities,  
urban districts, and counties, where familial connections to the highest CCP elites in Beijing are 
rare but the positions are also too removed from the highly localistic kinship networks that 
control subcounty politics.48    
Both anecdotal and more systematic evidence suggests that, at least for those mid-level 
subnational posts, the official promotion criteria matter:  When those criteria require local cadres 
to compete with each other to appeal to private actors like private investors or tourists, cadres 
aggressively conform to those criteria.49  Consider, for instance, the idea that the Chinese system 
of subnational government is “market-preserving” in that it is responsive to the demands of 
mobile capital.  Most famously defended by Montinola, Qian, and Weingast in the mid-1990s,50 
the “market-preserving” theory of federalism is rooted in the hypothesis that subnational officials 
will abstain from predatory expropriation of investment capital if they are evaluated on the basis 
of their jurisdiction’s GDP and revenue.  Official promotion criteria have historically 
emphasized a local government’s GDP and revenue generation,51 and the link between both of 
these criteria and private investment in land is plain enough. Moreover, the evidence suggests 
that Chinese local officials seeking promotion aggressively protect the interests of the owners of 
																																																						
47 See Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, & Ming Xingliu, Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the 
Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166 (2012).   
48 See, e.g., Li Xing et al., Political Competition at a Multilayer Hierarchy: Evidence from China, in THE CHINESE 
ECONOMY: A NEW TRANSITION 259 (M. Aoki et al. eds., 2012), 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137034298_12; Zhou Li-an (周黎安), 晋升博弈中政府官员的激励
与合作—兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因 [The Incentive and Cooperation of 
Government Officials in the Political Tournaments: An Interpretation of the Prolonged Local Protectionism and 
Duplicative Investments in China], 6 经济研究[STUD. ECON.] 33.  For a study on subcounty official positions 
dominated by local elites, see Feng Junqi (冯军旗), 中县干部 [Party Cadres in Central County] (June 2010) 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Peking University).  
49 For a humorous example of such competition, consider the reality TV show “Sights of Shanxi,” in which Chinese 
mayors are evaluated before a studio audience by their superiors on their capacity to attract tourists to their cities.  
The mayors vie with each other to sell their cities, making often colorful pitches and earning tough public criticism 
from a panel of judges when their pitches are rejected.   See You’re Stir-Fried Squid, THE ECONOMIST (June 18, 
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21700687-youre-fired-chinese-officials-meet-apprentice-youre-stir-
fried-squid  
50 See Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for 
Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POLITICS 50 (1995). 
51 See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CONTROL OF 
LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA (2008).  Economic growth has been the major evaluation criterion in the 
handbook of the CCP Central Personnel Department (中组部). 
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mobile capital just as they are instructed to do by the official criteria favoring economic 
growth.52  
GDP and revenue, as noted above, are only imperfectly related to the welfare of Chinese 
households.  The responsiveness of local cadres to foot-voting by owners of investment capital, 
however, suggests that, just as competition for promotion induces cadres to cater to the needs of 
investment capital, so too cadres might be induced to promote Chinese households’ interests if 
households’ foot-voting was made a central criterion for bureaucratic promotion.  As we explain 
below in Part III, one way to align cadres’ incentives with the foot-voting choices of households 
is to base bureaucratic promotion on the value of land within a local cadre’s jurisdiction.    
III. Using Land Values as the Best Proxy for Households’ Foot-Voting 
	
How can bureaucratic promotion criteria best be aligned with the choices of China’s foot-
voting households?  We suggest that the link is best expressed by a simple, single number: the 
change in a local government’s aggregate land prices over the period for which a local cadre is 
being evaluated.   Land prices that rise suggest that the local government is attracting mobile 
households, while falling land prices suggest that foot-voting households are choosing other 
jurisdictions.  In liberal democracies, “home voters” – meaning residents who elect local officials 
–  use this price signal as a guide for re-electing or throwing out incumbent officials.  In 
authoritarian regimes, the ruling regime’s bureaucratic evaluators of local officials can likewise 
use land values as a yardstick by which to measure official performance.  In response, local 
officials will plausibly respond by trying to boost land values.  We argue that this incentive will 
generally induce such officials to make their jurisdictions attractive to home buyers – in effective, 
campaigning for re-election before a constituency of foot-voters.   
A.  The Basic Defense of Land Values as the Best Proxy for Foot-Voters’ Choices   
	
Why should land prices rather than a jurisdiction’s net population gain or loss constitute the 
best measure of a local government’s ability to attract foot-voters?  The reason is that land prices 
provide more information about citizens’ preferences. As early as 1979, Arnott and Stiglitz noted 
																																																						
52 For a survey of evidence that local officials compete for investment to obtain promotions, see Chenggang Xu, The 
Fundamental Institutions of China's Reform and Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076 (2011), 
http://www.sef.hku.hk/~cgxu/04_Xu.pdf .   For evidence that success in winning revenue actually earns promotions 
for county-level officials, see H. Li & Li’An Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive 
Role of Personnel Control in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743 (2005). 
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that “the practice of inferring individual valuations of public goods from land values is now 
widespread.”53 As Anup Malani has noted, the amount by which a bid on a house in one 
jurisdiction exceeds bids on identical houses in other jurisdictions is a measure of how much 
more the bidder values the more expensive jurisdiction.54     Such relative desirability is 
influenced by local officials’ decisions about education, traffic regulation, crime control, and 
overall governmental efficiency, which are reflected – in economic jargon, “capitalized” – in real 
estate prices.  If land prices in one jurisdiction are much higher than land in neighboring 
jurisdictions, then this difference is an indication that the former’s land is much better governed.  
If one is interested in the intensity as well as the direction of citizens’ preferences, then higher 
land prices are superior to demographic growth as an indication of what and how much foot 
voters value the amenities offered by a local government.55 
Land prices shaped by citizens’ foot-voting help solve the dilemma of democratic centralism 
outlined in Part I above – the dilemma of administratively simple yet substantively complete 
promotion criteria.  The CCP wants to take into account all aspects of cadre performance that 
affect citizen welfare, but the CCP also needs to have criteria that yield some definite result 
when rival local officials compete for a promotion.  How, then, to rank cadres who score 
differently on different criteria?  How does one decide to award a promotion in a contest between 
the most frugal mayor, the mayor with the environmentally cleanest city, the mayor with the 
highest employment, and the mayor with the best educated children?   Each excelled the others 
in some respect but not in others: The CCP needs a simple bottom-line factor that will aggregate 
each of these values in a way reflective of citizen preferences.  Because homebuyers take into 
account every aspect of a jurisdiction’s quality when making a bid, land prices should “capitalize” 
otherwise incommensurable aspects of governmental performance into a single number.  Unlike 
numerical weights that the CCP assigns to different aspects of cadre performance, land prices are 
not arbitrary decisions by the CCP but instead reflect the collective ranking of these aspects by 
millions of foot-voting citizens.  Land prices, therefore, put the “democratic” back into 
																																																						
53 See Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal 
City Size, 93 Q. J. ECON. 471, 471 (1979). 
54 This point is ably defended by Anup Malani. See Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1273, 1273 (2008).  In general, our argument in this section is consistent with and relies upon Malani’s 
argument. 
55 The defense of land prices over simple demographic change, therefore is analogous to the defense of the single 
transferable vote over first-past-the-post plurality elections. 
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“democratic centralism,”  allowing the CCP to infer what citizens really value from what they 
are willing to pay.56   
Instead of land prices informed by citizens’ foot-voting, one might attempt to rely on survey 
instruments to rank cadres on their effectiveness in satisfying their constituents, as suggested by 
Li and Liang.57  But such direct measurement of satisfaction imposes enormous information 
costs on cadres’ supervisors.  As Li and Liang acknowledge, “[c]ompared with economic growth, 
inhabitants’ satisfaction is more difficult to measure.”58  They suggest that inhabitants of local 
government score their officials on various indices related to health, education, the environment, 
etc. There is little reason to believe, however, that mere public opinion surveys are an effective 
way to discern what citizens really want.  As Professor Ilya Somin notes, however, even with all 
of the safeguards of liberal democracy -- an independent press, competitive political parties, 
organized interest groups -- – voters are afflicted by political ignorance and collective action 
problems that depress turnout and lead to uninformed voting.59  Mere public opinion polls would 
suffer from proportionately greater problems of rational voter ignorance and collective apathy, 
because essential devices for organizing and informing voters (for instance, independent 
newspapers and interest groups) are missing in China.  
Land prices informed by citizens’ foot-voting, by contrast, provide an indication of citizens’ 
preferences that is not only simple and relatively accurate but also ideologically safe.  
Homebuyers make individualized rather than collective judgments about the value of real estate.  
The individualistic character of their home-purchasing decisions alleviates collective action 
problems faced by voters (or citizens being polled) in acquiring information, because each 
homebuyer faces large stakes and reaps all of the gains from their research into the competing 
merits of local governments.60  At the same time, such individualistic household choices do not 
announce to the world any abstract normative principles that compete with the CCP’s own 
ideology.  The private and self-interested character of their foot-voting, therefore, minimizes the 
chance that their judgments could constitute the spark that sets off a prairie fire of revolution 
																																																						
56 See Malani, supra note 54 at 1309-1311. 
57 See Shujuan Li & Yan Liang, Competition Model and the Change of Local Governments’ Behavior – and 
Governance of China’s Local Government Debt, 49 CHINESE ECON. 199 (2016) provides such an argument for 
tournaments between local officials who are assessed by the relative satisfaction of the citizens that they govern. 
58 Id. at 207. 
59 See Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance,  supra note 38, at 117-18. 
60	Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance,  supra note 38, at 138-145.	
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against the CCP.  Homebuyers on the move do not congregate in crowds, wave placards, shout 
angry slogans, or burn police cars.  From the point of view of civic participation, these traits are 
strikes against foot-voting.  From the point of view of the CCP, however, the private and 
individualistic character of house shopping is not a bug but a feature:   The bids on real estate of 
mobile foot-voters provide much of the same information that actual elections would provide 
without the risk that a narrow vote on garbage collection or quality of schools will suddenly and 
unexpectedly become a referendum on the legitimacy of CCP rule.   
B.  Refinements and Qualifications 
	
The basic idea that land prices should play a central role in the evaluation of cadres is simple 
enough – in fact, too simple.  Below, we offer some refinements and qualifications. 
1.  Henry George to the Rescue: Measuring land prices rather than real estate prices 
	
First, why focus on land prices rather than the price of real estate generally?  The focus on 
land adds an administrative headache to the evaluation process, because it requires the evaluators 
to determine the share of real estate’s value contributed by lots as opposed to structures.   
Nevertheless, land prices have an advantage over real estate prices:  As most famously noted by 
Henry George, the 19th century American journalist and reformer, the supply of land’s 
inelasticity limits the deadweight loss that results from governmental policies’ affecting the 
supply of housing.  Henry George was interested in avoiding the deadweight loss of property 
taxes’ discouraging construction of structures.  By taxing only and all the value of the land itself, 
government would avoid such disincentives, because landowners could not reduce the supply of 
parcels in response to the tax (say, by taking the land out of the taxing jurisdiction).   
There is an analogous advantage to focusing on land value for bureaucratic promotion.  
Cadres who wanted to drive up the price of housing could do so by using zoning regulations to 
restrict the production of housing or by holding state-owned land off the housing market.  If 
demand for housing in those cadres’ jurisdiction was price-inelastic, then the price of housing 
would be boosted, but foot-voters would be left unsatisfied, prohibited from migrating to a 
jurisdiction by an artificial housing shortage.  By focusing on the value of land in such a 
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jurisdiction, one avoids this perverse incentive to engage in such exclusion, as the value of 
restricted lots would fall with the rise in the price of permitted housing.61  
2.   Comparing Apples to Apples: Measuring change in local governments’ land prices 
relative to land price change in the metropolitan area  
 
Not all regions are equal.  Weather, natural features like harbors and rivers, geographic 
proximity to population centers, and economic activity, and many other features give some 
regions an inherent advantage over their rivals that no amount of expertise in government can 
eliminate.  The mayor of Ma’anshan in the inland province of Anhui cannot move his city closer 
to the Pearl River Delta, no matter how brilliant he is in allocating and managing his city’s 
money and rules.  Competition for foot-voters between Ma’anshan and the City of Guangzhou, 
therefore, is a rigged race:  Such a competition would not give any incentive to the inevitable 
losers to improve their performance.  To the contrary, as Cai and Treisman note, competition for 
mobile investors between jurisdictions with such different inherent endowments could lead to a 
“polarization effect” in which foot-voters all favor the better endowed while “[p]oorly endowed 
units, knowing they will lose, simply give up.”62   
To insure fair comparisons, therefore, cadres ought to be compared not on the basis of the 
absolute aggregated value of land in their jurisdiction but rather on the basis of in the change in 
that land’s value during the relevant period of evaluation.   If the mayor of Ma’anshan has 
managed to increase land values in his jurisdiction by a higher percentage than the percentage 
increase achieved by mayor of Guangzhou, then it would be odd to say that the latter 
outperformed the former merely because Guangzhou land prices were higher than Ma’anshan 
land prices.   
Likewise, cadres’ success or failure in raising land values should be assessed by comparing 
land in their jurisdiction only with land within the same metropolitan area.  Factors beyond any 
local government’s control – say, global warming and rising sea levels or central government 
spending in a particular area -- might affect the value of land.  Mayors who outperform their 
metropolitan areas should not be punished simply because their region happens to fall behind 
rival regions because of these extra-local factors.  By narrowing the range of competing local 
																																																						
61 See Malani, supra note 54 at 1293-94. 
62 Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, 
Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 817, 828 (2005).  
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governments and focusing on change in value regardless of starting or ending values, the central 
evaluators of local officials can narrow (although not entirely eliminate) endowment 
advantages.63 
3.   Avoiding short-term bubbles with medium-term land values and fiscal contraints  
	
In using land prices to evaluate cadres, it is important to avoid creating incentives for cadres 
to inflate short term land bubbles in order to win promotion.   There are, of course, ways in 
which local officials can temporarily increase the price of land without improving its governance.  
Simply by subsidizing land purchases with low-interest loans, a local government could pump up 
a real estate bubble that would deflate as soon as the subsidies ran out.  More generally, the 
CCP’s practice of rotating local officials through several subnational jurisdictions for very short  
(less than five-year) tenures in each jurisdiction can reduce local officials’ incentives to attend to 
the long-term consequences of their decisions.64    
 One way to lengthen local officials’ time horizon is to tie cadres’ fate to the medium- and 
long-term value of land in the jurisdictions that they govern is to tie their promotion to the rolling 
average of changes in the price of land over several years.   Such evaluations could give cadres 
incentives to care about the long-term consequences of their policies by tying cadres’ evaluations 
not only to changes in the price of land in jurisdictions that they currently manage but also the 
price of land in jurisdictions where they were formerly assigned.  The longer the period of time 
over which the average land price change was calculated, the more the cadre would have 
incentives to adopt policies that would create lasting values rather than short-term bubbles.   
																																																						
63 The evaluation criteria for an official governing Local District (LD) located in a Metropolitan Area (MA) can be 
expressed in the following formula. For each LDn, calculate ratio1, Δ total land value in LDn/Δ total land value in 
MAn. Denote ratios as ratio11, ratio12…ratio1n , where n is the number of districts within the metro area. Standardize 
these ratios as: ratio1i_s=[ratio1i-mean(ratio1)]/std(ratio1) , i=1,2…n where 
mean(ratio1)=( ratio11+ratio12+…+ratio1n )/n. std(ratio1) is the standard deviation of ratio1. 
64 As indirect evidence of the costs of rapid turnover of officials, consider evidence that enterprises postpone 
investment and banks were more reluctant to loan money to local governments during the turnover period.  Yang 
Haisheng et al., 政策不连续性与财政效率损失——来自地方官员变更的经验证据 [Discontinuition in Policies 
and Loss of Financial Efficiency—Empirical Evidence from the Change of Local Officials], MGMT. WORLD 
(MONTHLY) (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.mwm.net.cn/_d277131452.htm ; Luo Danglun & She Guoman, 地方官员
变更与地方债发行 [Change of Local Officials and Issuance of Local Debt], ECON. RES. J. (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.cesgw.cn/cn/NewsInfo.aspx?m=20100914093049340648&n=20151013142944963970 .  Homebuyers 
seem to share the same concern about short-tenured mayors as investors and banks. Thousands of Citizens of 
Datong City, Shanxi Province, stopped Yanbo Geng, the Chinese mayor featured in a BBC documentary, on his way 
out of the city for a better position because they were concerned that Geng’s urban redevelopment projects and 
policies would not be continued by his successor.	THE CHINESE MAYOR (Zhaoqi Films 2015) 
.   
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Suppose, for instance, that cadres were evaluated on the basis of a five-year rolling average 
of land prices, using land in not only current but also former jurisdictions to calculate such 
averages.  Under such an evaluation procedure, a cadre who had served for three years as a 
county party secretary after formerly serving as a township party secretary for the previous three 
years would be evaluated not only on the basis of the three-year performance of land in his 
county where he was an incumbent but also on the basis of the performance of land prices for the 
previous two years in his former township -- two years after he left township office.  Faced with 
the prospect of being evaluated by changes in land prices in jurisdictions following the end of 
their tenure in such jurisdictions, outgoing local officialswould have incentives to install 
supporters in key positions so their value-enhancing reforms could continue past the end of their 
term.65     
To further avoid short-term bubbles, the central government should incorporate local debt 
burdens into local government leaders’ evaluations. A local leader can manipulate public 
investments to maximize land value during his term but compromise a city’s long-term growth 
potential. Considering the importance of local government finance and the time bomb of huge 
local government debt in China, additional safeguards are in order where local governments’ 
debt is concerned.  In theory, bondbuyers and homeowners might together punish local officials 
who incur excessive debt by bidding lower amounts for land and bonds.  In practice, however, 
the likelihood that the central government will bail out local governments before they go 
bankrupt encourages local officials to incur excessive debt based on the national government’s 
credit.66    
4. Protecting Workers:  Qualifying land values with rent-income ratio (“RIR”) 
 
																																																						
65Leaders at the county/urban district level or below have the power to recommend and evaluate their potential 
successors according to Article 25 of the 2009 Work Regulations on Promotion of Party and Government Leaders.		
66 For a general discussion of the tendency of subnational governments to impose exernal costs on the budgetary 
commons by borrowing on the de facto credit of the national government, see JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S 
PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM (2005).  For the challenges of imposing a hard budget 
constraint ex ante on local officials in China, see Jing Jin and Heng-fu Zou  Soft Budget Constraints and Local 
Government in China, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 289 
(Jonathan A. Rodden et al. eds. 2003). As Arnott and Stiglitz argued, the idea that local public goods are capitalized 
into land rents does not insure that cities will compete for the optimal number of residents, because the Arnott-
Stiglitz model’s equilibrium is partial insofar as it does not incorporate any local government budget balance 
constraint.  See Arnott & Stiglitz, Aggregate Land Rents,  93 Q.J. ECON. at 491.  
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The CCP has goals aside from encouraging value-maximizing governance.  They are, after 
all, communists with presumptively egalitarian priorities.    They are also practically wary of 
unrest brought about by rapidly escalating rents and stagnant wages.  The mayor who managed 
to boost land values through superb governance but also displaced his city’s working-class 
residents through escalating rents would inspire popular riots rather than official plaudits.  To 
insure that local officials minimize the disruption and unfairness of rents’ outstripping wages, 
therefore, the central evaluators ought to consider the ratio of rents to income in making 
promotion decisions.  Local officials who preside over rising ratios in which residents pay an 
ever-higher percentage of their income for rent should not be rewarded regardless of how much 
their jurisdiction’s land prices appreciate relative to land prices in their metropolitan area.  
Indeed, the CCP already takes into account the “property-income ratio” in making promotions.67  
This qualification on the use of land values, therefore, simply preserves a bit of the status quo. 
One might protest that there is an inherent contradiction in rewarding mayors for increasing 
land prices but punish them for escalating rents and falling wages.  After all, an influx of 
homebuyers to a jurisdiction will ceteris paribus predictably cause rents to rise and wages to 
fall.68  Why does not the criterion of a steady rent-income ratio simply cancel out the criterion of 
appreciating land values?   
The reason is that matters are not ceteris paribus:  the enterprising local official should fight 
rising rents with more housing.  As more foot-voters pour into a popular jurisdiction, local 
officials can increase the supply of housing by increasing the density and quantity of 
residentially zoned land.   If supply of housing matches the demand, then rents should stay 
steady even as prices of a unit of land appreciate, because more people will live on the same 
amount of land.  Local officials can, in short, simultaneously attract new homebuyers and make 
room for them by expanding the housing supply.    
There are admittedly limits on the degree to which the technology of housing density can 
match rising demand.  Higher densities can erode demand for land, because density sometimes 
has costs, especially where the supply of land is tight, such as crowded sidewalks, shadows from 
																																																						
67See Chen Qinggui,考绩“房价收入比”须把握三个关键 [Three Keys for Incorporating Price-Income Ratio in 
Evaluation], CHINA NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.chinanews.com/estate/2011/01-24/2806953.shtml; 今日聚焦：
房价收入比纳入官员考核靠谱吗? [Today’s Focus: Is It Plausible to Incorporate Price-Income Ratio in Cadre 
Evaluation?], SINA (Aug. 1, 2016), http://dichan.sina.com.cn/sh/zt/136guanyuan/  
68 See Malani, supra note 54 at 1280-90. 
27 
	
tall buildings, and the like.  These features of density make land less attractive and force local 
officials to choose between raising housing supply but reducing demand (i.e., making their 
jurisdictions marginally less attractive to foot-voters) or protecting land values but displacing 
wage-earners who cannot keep up with the rising rents.   
This dilemma, however, might be more theoretical than real.  Chinese local governments 
tend to control large territories with plentiful non-residential land.69  There would not likely be 
many circumstances in which the only way in which extra foot-voters could be housed would be 
to build skyscrapers next to scenic views or demolish historic districts.  Even when such a 
conflict between increased supply of and demand for housing arose, however, the dilemma could 
be solved simply by evaluating officials on a weighted average of each value.  Under such a 
dual-factor system, each local government would be rated not only on the basis of the change in 
land prices within their local government relative to land prices in their metropolitan area but 
also on  their local government’s  change in the rent-income ratio relative to changes in the 
metropolitan rent-income ratio.  Officials who scored well on attracting foot-voters but poorly on 
increasing housing supply would lose out in such a tournament to officials who took a more 
balanced approach to development.70    
IV.   Foot-Voting with Chinese Characteristics:  Three Feasible Institutional Reforms to 
Improve Citizen Mobility  
 
  The defense of foot-voting and land values offered above ignores the specifics of local 
governments’ design.  Those details, however, matter.  The size, number, and powers of local 
governments dramatically affect the capacity of citizens to vote with their feet.   For foot-voting 
citizens to make meaningful choices among competing jurisdictions, there must be a sufficient 
number of jurisdictions among which to choose.  The citizens’ choices should also not be 
muddied by radical differences among the competing jurisdictions’ private goods like higher 
wages and job opportunities.  Moreover, citizens’ migration must trigger not only the right to 
																																																						
69 On the large amounts of rural land within prefectural-level and county-level cities, see Kam Wing Chan, 
Urbanization and Urban Infrastructure Services in the PRC, in FINANCING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Christine P.W. Wong ed. 1997).    
70Again, the criteria can be expressed by a simple formula similar to the ratio set forth supra at note 63.  This second 
ratio2 compares the RIR in Local District (LDn) to the RIR in that LD’s metropolitan area (MA).  Calculate a 
standardized ratio2, Δ RIR in LDn/Δ RIR in MA, and denote them as ratio21_s, ratio22_s…ratio2n_s.  The weighted 
average this standardized ratio with the ratio of LD to MA land prices set forth in supra note 63 is a* ratio1i_s+b* 
ratio2i_s, where a+b=1. 
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receive local services but also the obligation to pay for them; otherwise, such migration does not 
reveal that the citizens value governmental services at the cost of supplying them.  Local officials 
must have the power to respond to migrants’ demands by extending services to newcomers and 
charging those newcomers for the services’ costs.  In this section we address three institutional 
obstacles to foot-voting, namely limited fiscal instruments, improper size of local governments, 
and the hukou system, and provide practical remedies to each of them.  
A. The Problem of Limited Fiscal Instruments 
	
Foot-voting reveals that a citizen values the benefits of public services net of those 
services costs only if the foot-voting citizen is liable for those costs.  The decision to migrate to a 
jurisdiction, therefore, should trigger not only the right to receive services offered by a local 
government but also the obligation to pay for them.  Chinese local governments, however, 
cannot easily maintain such a link between the right to receive and the obligation to pay for 
public services, because Chinese law severely limits local governments’ fiscal instruments.    The 
result of such fiscal inflexibility is not only that local governments frequently gain no additional 
revenue from new migrants but also that local officials cannot improve land values by supplying 
services at lower costs than neighboring jurisdictions.  Both limits prevent good governmental 
policies from being reflected in land prices.  
The obvious solution is to broaden the range of local governments’ taxing powers – and, 
in particular, to give local governments the power to impose property taxes.  Proposals to vest 
local governments with property-taxing powers have been broached before, but the tax has not 
been popular with the CCP because of its potential to trigger urban unrest among aggrieved 
property owners.  We argue below, however, that such a tax is politically feasible if it is tied up 
with more autonomy over tax revenues and more influence by taxed interests over the 
expenditure of those revenues to enhance local property values. 
1.  How Lack of Taxing Power Impedes Foot-Voting 
	
Most local taxes in China are skewed towards business-derived revenue, such as value added 
taxes, corporate income taxes, and business taxes, and taxes on housing ownership have not been 
29 
	
substantial71  Local governments that provide excellent services and thereby attract new migrants 
may find that these new homebuyers crowd schools and roads without providing a 
commensurate gain in the government’s capacity to pay for them, reducing local land values 
instead of increasing them.  	
The lack of taxing power results in local officials running counter to citizens’ foot-voting.  
Local officials have an incentive to exclude new migrants even if the economy of a jurisdiction 
would benefit from more people.  There is evidence that the population of Chinese cities is too 
small insofar as Chinese labor would be more productive if it were located in more densely 
populated jurisdictions where the labor has its highest value.72  Yet the leaders of Chinese cities 
often complain about new migrants, egged on by angry residents fearful that newcomers will 
crowd schools and roads.  Such complaints make sense to the extent that local governments 
cannot recover the costs of service provision from new migrants because they are legally 
disempowered from imposing taxes on residential property.   
In theory, local governments’ ground leases of state-owned land to private lessees might 
mitigate or even eliminate these perverse fiscal incentives.  As a concession to local governments, 
the central government gave its share in land sales revenue to local governments in the 1998 
revision to the Land Administration Law.73 Since then with the rise of Chinese real estate market, 
land sales revenue has become an important source of revenue for local governments, ranging 
from 28% to 72% of local budgets from 2002 to 2010, and 34.9% of the revenues of prefectural-
level cities.74 
Such ground leases offer important advantages over local governments’ other sources of 
revenue, because they give local officials the flexibility and incentives to tailor revenue, 
regulations, and expenditures to foot-voting lessees.  Because lessees might be expected to pay 
more for land that is well-governed, ground leases give local officials a fiscal incentive to 
maximize the value of land in their regulatory decisions.75  The long terms of ground leases, 
																																																						
71 Local governments also derive revenue from property-related taxes including the urban maintenance and 
construction tax, urban and township land use tax, farmland occupation tax, and land appreciation tax.  Thee revenue 
derived from these taxes, however, comprises only a small proportion of local governments’ total revenue. 
72 See Chun-Chung Au & J. Vernon Henderson, Are Chinese Cities Too Small? 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 549  (2006). 
73 Qiao Shitong, The Politics of Chinese Land:  Partial Reform, Vested Interests, and Small Property, 29 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 70, 90-103 (2016). 
74 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 23 (2014).  
75 See Montignola, Qian, & Weingast, supra note 50, at 58. 
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however, make them an extraordinarily inelastic device by which to recover the revenue needed 
to run a local government.  The leases give the local government no capacity to recover 
additional revenue from lessees during the life of the lease based on the local government’s 
success in attracting new migrants and thereby enhancing the value of leased land.  A new mayor 
whose city’s land has already been leased out cannot recover revenue from the lessees to 
improve the city with new post-lease amenities, even if those amenities are precisely what foot-
voters are currently seeking.  In calculating the lessee’s payment at the outset of the lease, 
therefore, local officials will somehow need to predict their government’s financial needs and the 
likely benefits of the local government’s expenditures over the several decades of the life of a 
lease – a challenge in prophecy that might intimidate even the most prescient gamblers.   The 
uproar occasioned by the City of Wenzhou’s charging lessees substantial sums to renew their 
land leases demonstrates the risk of disconnecting government’s land revenue from private 
property value.76   
Chinese local governments also do not control the rate and base of the fiscal instruments 
from which they derive their revenue.  Because the rate and base even for “local” taxes is defined 
by national law, subnational governments cannot compete with each other by offering a reduced 
tax burden to prospective homebuyers.77   
 2. How to make a local property tax politically feasible  
	
There is an economically obvious, normatively appealing, but politically challenging 
solution to local governments’ limited fiscal instruments.  The National People’s Congress could 
enact a law conferring on local governments the power to levy a tax on real property.78  Although 
this solution is politically challenging, we argue below that it is also politically feasible.  
																																																						
76 See e.g., Ren Wei, China’s Grey-Area For Property Buyers: Homeowners Face Doubts Over Renewing Land-Use 
Leases, S.CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1936991/chinas-grey-area-property-buyers-homeowners-face-
doubts-over ; Stuart Leavenworth & Kiki Zhao, In China, Homeowners Find Themselves in a Land of Doubt, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/international/in-china-homeowners-find-
themselves-in-a-land-of-doubt.html?_r=0;  Lucy Hornby, China Lease Expiries Prompt Property Rights Angst, FT 
(May 2, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/952be9a4-0abe-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3. 
77 According to Article 8 of the Law on Legislation, such a property tax can only be legislated by the NPC or NPC 
Standing Committee.  See 中华人民共和国立法法 [Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, 2000 Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. Gaz. 112). 
78 See id. 
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The property tax solution is economically obvious:  a property tax would give local 
officials a revenue incentive to put out the welcome mat for newcomers, because growth would 
pay its own way.  In effect, a property tax coupled with local governments’ already-broad power 
to regulate land use behaves as a user fee, in which new migrants receive the benefit of local 
public goods only if they pay their share of those goods’ average cost.79  So long as the goods are 
not congested by additional users, old-timer residents should welcome the revenue that the 
newcomers bring.  
The property tax solution is also normatively attractive, because it would mobilize local 
homeowners into monitoring local affairs.   By making more visible the cost of governmental 
services, property taxes would force local cadres to justify those costs.80 By making public 
expenditure more visible, the property tax can give property owners incentives to review local 
governments’ spending.  Moreover, local leaders seeking to raise property taxes for new projects 
will have an incentive to assuage local homeowners with opportunities to review budgets and 
comment on expenditures.81  Once the property tax becomes the main source of local 
governments’ revenue, the English history as described in Douglas North and Barry Weingast’s 
“constitution and commitment” can be repeated in China.82   
For all of its economic and normative appeal, however, the property tax solution, is 
politically tricky, because property taxes have historically inspired popular resentment and even 
mass incidents.  The agricultural tax was abolished in 2007 in large part because of farmers’ 
resistance.83  Recent narrow experiments with property taxes in Chongqing and Shanghai have 
																																																						
79 See Bruce W. Hamilton, A Review: Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax?, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: 
THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 85 (George R. Zodrow ed. 2013); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning 
and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URBAN STUD. 205 (1975) (arguing property tax is an 
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yielded insubstantial revenue and exempted most property.84  Circumstantial evidence suggests 
that the CCP leadership has been concerned with the political risk while agreeing on the 
desirability of property tax. The Chinese Minister of Finance said recently “property tax reform 
is a conundrum… but has to be done discarding hesitation.85    
Nevertheless, we believe that broad authorization for property taxes is now politically 
feasible, because property tax burdens are a more predictable and more elastic source of revenue 
than ground lease rents.  As ground leases expire in cities across China, the terms under which 
such leases will be renewed issue will become increasingly prominent.  As the controversy 
surrounding Wenzhou’s charging of a stiff fee to renew such leases indicates, homeowners 
dislike the unpredictability of these rents.86  As noted above, such ground leases are an inelastic 
instrument for raising revenue, because the local government is forced to cover a multi-decade 
period of expenditures with a single, large lump-sum amount of rent.  Why not, then, trade the 
right to charge high fees for ground lease renewal for the right to impose property taxes?   From 
the lessee’s point of view, the trade would allow them to amortize their rent over many years by 
making quarterly or annual property tax payments rather than a single up-front rent payment.  
Moreover, precisely because they are levied for shorter intervals of time, lessees have more 
opportunities to contest the amount of the taxes, demanding equivalent returns in services.  To 
sweeten the pot for homeowners, the National People’s Congress could make a local 
government’s authority to impose property taxes contingent on the local government’s assurance 
to lessees that no further fees or rents, beyond the property tax, would be imposed as a condition 
for renewal of the ground lease, eliminating the uncertainty of title from which ground lessees 
suffer in a system of multi-decade renewals. Moreover property-related taxes now paid by real 
estate developers actually constitute from 50 to 60 percent of property prices and therefore are 
paid indirectly by property buyers.87 Replacing these fragmented property-related taxes with a 
																																																																																																																																																																														
details about agricultural tax burden and rural resistance in China, see Lu Xiaobo, The Politics of Peasant Burden 
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84 See Asian Development Bank, supra note74.  
85 See 楼继伟：义无反顾推进房地产税制改革 [Lou Jiwei, Pushing Forward Real Estate Tax Reform without 
Hesitation], XINHUA (July 24, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-07/24/c_129172837.htm.   
86 See Stuart Leavenworth & Kiki Zhaomay, In China, Homeowners Find Themselves in a Land of Doubt, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/international/in-china-homeowners-find-
themselves-in-a-land-of-doubt.html?_r=0    
87 See Chen Shaoying (陈少英), 论我国物业税的立法目标 [On Legislative Objectives of Real Estate Tax in Our 
Country], 74 EASTERN CHINA UNIV. POL. SCI. & L.J., (2011), available at 
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uniform property tax therefore would not increase the burden of property buyers, but simply 
make their contribution to the government finance more visible, giving them more leverage in 
urban governance.88   
In short, the gradual expiration of ground leases across dozens of Chinese cities, in 
particular, provides a golden, once-in-a-generation opportunity for the National People’s 
Congress to replace an inelastic, politically contentious, and unpredictable source of revenue 
with a system of property taxation that will allow local officials to compete with each other on 
their ability to cut tax burdens as well as provide services. 
B.  The Problem of Excessive Size	
 
Related to the problem of local governments’ limited fiscal instruments is the problem of 
local governments’ excessive size.  A relatively tiny number of local governments have final and 
pervasive power over immense amounts of land, making it difficult for any homebuyer 
practically to shop among competing providers of local public goods.  Such territorially immense 
local governments effectively operate as local monopolies, extracting locational rents from 
homebuyers who, because of employment and family ties, cannot exit an entire metropolitan area 
in order to seek a better deal from a competing local government.  As with the limits on fiscal 
instruments, however, there is a politically palatable fix well within the pale of Chinese political 
traditions – the fix of a federated city.    
1.  Chinese Cities as Leviathans:  The Costs of Unified Metro Government 
	
A brief overview of local governments in a single province illustrate the vastness of the 
territory governed by Chinese cities.  The province of Guangdong, for instance, contains 108 
million residents89 but only 21 sub-provincial cities.90 Its capital city, Guangzhou, has eleven 
urban districts each of which governs over a million population on average but are simply 
subsidiaries of the city government lacking independent zoning power. By contrast, New York 
State, with a population roughly one and half the size of Guangzhou City, contains within its 
borders 932 towns, 551 villages, and 62 cities. There are 48 towns, cities, and villages in 
																																																						
88 See id.  
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Westchester County alone, all of which are within a practical commuting distance from New 
York City.  Each of these local governments can make independent decisions about zoning, 
expenditures, and taxation levels.  
Chinese cities containing so much land control the entire economy of a metropolitan area 
where many mutually dependent businesses congregate to take advantage of “agglomeration 
economies” – that is, the benefits of locating near to other similar businesses.91    Such 
businesses and their employees cannot freely shop among metropolitan areas for the best 
providers of public services, because some areas will have built-in advantages – inherent 
“endowments” in Cai and Treisman’s phrase – that defeat rival jurisdictions’ efforts to attract 
investment through superior governance.92  If local officials were promoted based on their 
success in increasing the price of housing, then local officials controlling such immense 
quantities of real estate would have incentives to behave like Brennan and Buchanan’s 
“leviathans” rather than like competitive businesses:  they would extract locational rents from 
captive land buyers by reducing housing supply.93  The price of housing might increase in such a 
jurisdiction, but these increases would not reflect social benefits but rather deadweight costs of 
frustrated demand, as workers were deterred by governmental policy from migrating to the areas 
where their labor is most productive.  The demand for land within such immense jurisdictions is 
predictably price-inelastic, because, for many households, there are few adequate substitutes for 
all of the land in an entire metropolitan area. It has long been argued by economists that the 
inelasticity of supply of local governments insures that pure citizen mobility can never fully 
replace citizen voice. 94   The large physical size and arguable under-population of Chinese cities 
suggests that this theoretical objection to foot-voting has practical application in China. 
The obvious solution to the problem of excessive size is to delegate land-use planning 
powers to smaller scale units of local government that can be clustered into a single metropolitan 
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area.  Assuming some transportation network that permits employees of any business in the area 
to live within any of these local governments and commute to work, no household would ever be 
forced to choose between the benefit of higher wages and the benefit of better public services in 
such a governmentally fragmented urban area. Local governments within the United States 
frequently achieve such densities. The result is that households tied by employment or family to 
a particular commutershed can nevertheless shop among dozens of competing providers of local 
public goods.  None of these tiny governments controls enough land to increase housing prices 
by restricting supply.  
Extreme decentralization of zoning and taxing authority, however, is hardly a panacea.  
Because tiny local governments cannot capture the benefits of regulatory programs that extend 
throughout a commutershed, local officials in charge of those governments tend to neglect those 
programs.  Again, Westchester County provides an illustrative case.  The individual towns and 
villages within the County zone their residential land primarily for single-family detached houses, 
excluding multi-family housing affordable by working class families.95 Although local 
governments may have several motives for such exclusion of affordable housing, one reason is 
fiscal:  Property taxes levied on multi-family housing often do not cover the costs of educating 
the children residing in such housing.   Affordable housing is beneficial to industrial and 
commercial employers who need to attract employees with affordable rents, and commercial and 
industrial uses often generate tax revenue in excess of the costs of services.  The local 
governments that do not host the industrial or commercial uses, however, have no power to tax 
those uses to cover the costs of educating the employees’ children.  In effect, local governments 
in Westchester County face a collective action problem:  Each wants to host and tax non-
residential uses that depend on affordable housing that each would prefer other jurisdictions to 
host and provide with services.96 
In choosing local governments with the right physical size, therefore, Chinese law-makers 
face a dilemma.97  If the local governments are too physically large, then they will create a 
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“leviathan effect” by extracting locational rents rather than competing for new residents, but, if 
they are too small, then they will not capture the benefits of the uses that they regulate.98  
Extremely large territories relative to population, soaring urban property prices, and under-
populated Chinese cities all suggest that, in China, the “leviathan” effect predominates.99   The 
question remains whether the Chinese system of local government can be reformed in a 
politically feasible way to balance successfully these rival risks.  
2. The Solution of the Federated City 
	
We suggest that China’s current multi-layered system of local government provides the CCP 
leadership with ample opportunities to experiment with what we call “the federated city,” a 
metropolitan organization that can simultaneously avoid the leviathan effect and still capture 
regional economies in the production of laws and infrastructure.   Our basic proposal is that sub-
city governments ought to be given more functionally specialized taxing, spending, and 
regulatory powers that are tailored to their geographic scope.  Urban districts embedded in cities, 
for instance, ought to have the power to tax land in their territory to finance the infrastructure and 
regulation primarily beneficial to district land.  Cities, in turn, ought to have primary 
responsibility for that infrastructure with primarily regional public goods.  On this division of 
responsibilities, Pudong District, a subdivision of Shanghai, would be responsible for imposing 
taxes on its own real estate to finance Century Park, the 140-hectare park located in Pudong’s 
new area that likely increases the value mostly of land located in Pudong.  By contrast, the 
Shanghai government would be responsible for financing Pudong International Airport, because 
the entire region is served by such large-scale transit infrastructure.  
Is such a suggested reform of metropolitan government politically feasible in China?  
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Debates about the proper scale of local government in China are hardly novelties, dating back at 
least to the Qing Dynasty, when the emperor rejected the creation of townships for fear that they 
would add to residents’ tax burden.100   More recently (between 1993 and 1997), China has 
experimented with allowing counties to apply to become “county-level cities” (“CLCs”) with 
greater access to revenue and regulatory powers than ordinary counties.101  The central 
authorities abandoned the creation of new CLCs in 1997, perhaps motivated by the absence of 
evidence that CLCs actually outperformed ordinary counties102 and also by the additional costs 
that such CLCs imposed on the central government.103  There is, however, little doubt that the 
Chinese leadership has the political will to experiment with delegations of greater powers to 
smaller units.  The political feasibility of such a reform might increase to the extent that the 
newly empowered units were expected to pay their own way with own-source tax revenue. 
Would devolution of power to smaller units improve metropolitan governance?  There is 
circumstantial evidence that prefectural-level cities’ productivity increases if they contain more 
than a single urban district, with the benefits peaking at 3 districts per city with 1.28 million 
residents.104   It is difficult, however, to assess the relative performance of unified versus 
fragmented metropolitan areas in China, because China has not delegated the sort of broad 
regulatory or taxing powers that we recommend to the subdivisions of cities.105  
In absence of firmer evidence, pilot programs are in order to test the benefits and costs of 
fragmentation.  Facilitating foot-voting requires some strengthening of sub-city units to enable 
citizens to shop within a single metropolitan area, but Chinese reformers are already 
experimenting with such devolution.106  Such a devolution needs not result in under-sized urban 
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districts’ imposing external costs on their neighbors or neglecting externally beneficial 
infrastructure, because cities in which these subunits are embedded could pick up the regional 
slack.  In particular, tax revenue from large-scale businesses employing commuters from the 
entire region could be redistributed to those urban districts that provide housing and services 
such as schools for workers at such enterprises, avoiding the collective action problem 
confronted by small local governments competing for business but shunning the housing needed 
to attract workers.  
C. Reforming Hukou to Facilitate Foot-Voting 
The power of Chinese citizens to vote with their feet is limited by China’s system of household 
registration system (hukou).  Inhabitants without hukou do not get the benefits of local medical, 
educational, and other social services provided by the local government.  To what extent are such 
impediments to free mobility an obstacle to the sort of foot-voting that we defend? 
1.  The Obstacle of Hukou to Foot-Voting 
There is no doubt that hukou poses a major obstacle to Chinese citizens’ foot-voting.  It is 
a paradox that the more migrants a city attracts, the more reluctant a city government is to open 
its social welfare system to such migrants. Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou -- all 
Chinese mega cities and economic engines that are the most popular destinations for migrant 
population -- are also the most aggressive in strictly limiting their schools and social security 
systems to people with hukou. Although the central government has pushed hukou reform across 
the country, it has accommodated the largest cities’ desire to exclude persons without hukou, 
adopting instead the policy of “open[ing] the hukou system in towns and small cities 
comprehensively, open[ing]] the hukou system in medium-size cities orderly, in big cities 
reasonably, and strictly control[ling] the population of especially big cities.”107  The State 
Council has defined “especially big cities” as cities with more than five million population, 
which108 would exclude essential reforms in most of the fast-growing cities. The number of 
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people excluded from local services by the hukou system is staggering, constituting huge 
percentages of the residents in China’s “mega-cities.109 
 The basic motivation for hukou is the absence of an effective mechanism by which cities 
can charge migrants with the costs of the services that these migrants consume.  City mayors 
view the migrant population as a pure burden, because they cannot impose property taxes on new 
residents. Lacking a direct and simple way to tax residential development, local officials rely on 
complex formula for awarding hukou to migrants likely to add to a city’s economic productivity 
and not tax city services. Despite some differences in details, Chinese mega cities have granted 
hukou to migrants based on education, wealth, skills, and youthfulness.110 The essentially fiscal 
character of hukou is revealed by the bonus points awarded to outside investors who create 
above a certain number of job opportunities and pay above a certain amount of taxes.111  Such a 
complex mechanism for rationing hukou excludes many citizens from recieiving services who 
might be willing and able to pay for them.   
Concededly, some sort of link between revenues and expenditures is necessary not only 
for economic efficiency but also for foot-voting democracy.112  In order to cast an intelligent 
“foot-vote” on both expenditures and revenue-generation, citizens’ choice of a jurisdiction as 
their residence must trigger not only the right to receive local benefits but also the obligation to 
pay for those benefits.  Otherwise migration does not reveal that the citizen values the benefit at 
its cost of production.  Given the limits on local taxing powers, the hukou-awarding system in 
Chinese big cities is actually quite rational as a way of matching revenues and expenditures. But 
a mechanism like Shanghai’s that rates migrants by a complex mix of factors is nevertheless a 
crude mechanism by which to assess migrants’ willingness to pay.  
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Whether a migrant worker would contribute to a city economy sufficiently to cover the 
costs of local services that the migrant receives should be decided on a far simpler basis -- 
whether he or she has a job the wages of which suffice to cover the costs of the services that he 
receives.   If there is demand for the migrant’s labor within a jurisdiction sufficient to cover both 
the public and private costs of the migrant’s working in that jurisdiction, then why should the 
city government deter the migration by withholding local services?  One need to (and we do not) 
endorse the view that cities will inevitably reach their optimal population through private 
migration decisions just so long as migrants pay the average cost of the public services that they 
consume.113  The justification for restricting city size, however, should be rooted in some 
specific analysis of a market failure in private locational decisions, not in local governments’ 
arbitrarily limited choice of fiscal instruments.  The challenge of hukou reform is to figure out 
how local governments can more directly charge migrant workers for the costs of the  local 
public services that they consume as a result of their decision to migrate. 
2.  Reforming the Hukou System through broader fiscal instruments and federative local 
governments  
 
We urge that hukou within a jurisdiction be based exclusively on the migrants’ purchase or 
rental of real property in the jurisdiction providing the service for which hukou is sought.  Our 
proposal for hukou reform, however, is contingent on the adoption of our two previous 
recommendations for the broadening of smaller local governments’ taxing and regulatory powers 
in the context of a federated metropolitan area.  At its most basic level, we urge that the 
migrant’s willingness to pay the price of renting or buying land presumptively indicates that  the 
migration is cost-justified, just so long as local governments have broad powers to charge new 
migrants for the services that they consume and are small enough not to act as little leviathans, 
extracting locational rents by restricting housing supply.  Further refinements of migration 
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incentives, we suggest below, can be managed by the federated metropolitan areas described and 
defended in Part IV(B)(2) above. 
Our proposal does not eliminate hukou.  Under our proposal, cities can still withhold services 
from citizens who neither rent nor buy real estate within the service-providing jurisdiction.  In 
this respect, our proposed form of hukou resembles the concept of “bona fide residency” in U.S. 
constitutional law.114   If we treat hukou as a shorthand for eligibility to enjoy the public services 
and urban governance provided by a particular jurisdiction, then, under our proposal, each city 
would have its own hukou system in which residents who own or rent an apartment in a city are 
“granted hukou” – that is, made eligible to receive the package of local public goods provided by 
the local government.  The local government’s power to exclude persons who have not invested 
in local real estate distinguishes our proposal from alternative recommendations that abandon the 
hukou system completely by delegating to the central government the task of guaranteeing every 
citizen equal access to the same “basic” public services across different local governments.115  
Our justification for rooting hukou in the purchase or rental of land requires the adoption of our 
previous proposals calling for  territorially smaller local governments to exercise a broader set of 
taxing powers.  If local governments can re-capture the value they confer on land through their 
services, then the price of that land should presumptively reflect both the value of the services 
and the burden of the taxes needed to finance them.   
 Would a property-based hukou system exclude middle-and-low income population from a 
city?  We think not.  Consider the example of  so-called“left-behind children” (liushou ertong, 留
守儿童). Parents seeking higher wages in a productive city where they lack hukou must now 
leave their children behind in the village where they have hukou so that their children can attend 
																																																						
114 For an explanation of how lack of “bona fide residency” is a sufficient basis under the U.S. Constitution for local 
governments to withhold basic educational and other local services, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, 
and Federalism: States’ Duty of Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 281-83, 288-98, 301-309, 
312-26.  For an example of the U.S. Supreme court’s upholding a school district’s exclusion of a child from its 
public schools because the child was not a bona fide resident of the school district, see Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 
321 (1983). 
115 See Wang Ling, 户籍制度改革推进缓慢 学者建议改革机制 [Reform of the Household Registration System 
has Moved Forward Slowly; Scholar Suggests Reform Mechanisms], YICAI (May 27, 2015), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-07/31/c_126819302.htm (stating that the central government has the power 
to design the system); Kam Wing Chan,The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on 
a Debate, 36 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 357, 361 (one stream of reform proposals is concerned with making the 
hukou system more "humane," for example, offering urban hukou to migrant workers’ children and parents).  
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school.116  Such family separations can be emotionally painful and logistically difficult.117 
Because migrant workers frequently rent housing where they work, however, our proposal would 
entitle them to bring their children with them. 
 Secondly, would local governments be incentivized to limit development density to 
insure that each migrant pays the average per capita cost of local services? Because property 
taxes are typically levied on the value of land and improvements, landowners who squeeze more 
people into a less valuable structure pay less taxes per unit of service consumed than landowners 
who develop land at a lower density with more valuable structures. Therefore local governments 
might be incentivitzed to impose a prohibition on high-density development, a form of “fiscal 
zoning,” thereby transforming the property tax into a benefits charge under which each resident 
is forced to pay a minimum tax price sufficient to cover her consumption of services like 
education for her children.118  
 We believe that the danger of fiscal zoning is mitigated by the weakness of urban districts 
and the supervisory role of prefectural-level cities, characteristics that avoid both “leviathan” 
effects and externalities.   Urban districts are too small to enjoy monopoly over an entire  
metropolitan area’s land.  They are, however, also large enough to capture many of the external 
benefits conferred by affordable housing on commercial, office, and industrial uses.  The urban 
district and county, therefore, resembles what Professorr William Fischel calls the “concentrated” 
metropolitan area --  an area with enough local governments to avoid “monopoly pricing” for 
land yet not so many that such competition leads to free-riding and collective action problems 
excluding affordable housing necessary to attract employers on the theory that neighboring 
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jurisdictions could provide such housing.119 Even though current interjurisdictional competition 
in China focuses on investment, we have seen evidence that local governments open public 
services and provide residential land to increase their competitiveness.120 Moreover, we note that 
the devolution of taxing and regulatory power to urban districts leaves in place prefectural-level 
cities’ powers to correct external economies between districts.  In a federative metropolitan area, 
the prefectural-level city could be given control over business-oriented taxes imposed on 
industrial and commercial uses, redistributing some share of this tax revenue to districts that 
provide the housing and educational services needed by those employers’ workers.   
 
 Conclusion 
	
By promoting local officials on the basis of local land values, Chinese law could give them 
an incentive to cultivate allies who would protect those values on which the officials’ careers 
rested.  These allies would not be motivated by high-minded ideals of democracy and human 
rights but selfish and grubby preferences to safeguard their down payment.  Precisely for that 
reason, the CCP could tolerate the sorts of participation that these foot-voters-turned-homevoters 
would foster.  Compared with the exercise of ballot-voting on more abstract and edifying issues,  
such local participation on garbage collection and school performance  might seem like small 
potatoes.  But those are the only potatoes on offer in China in the current regime.  We suggest 
that such improvements, small as they are, are worth advancing, both for CCP leaders intent on 
promoting their own legitimacy and assuaging Weibo anger, and for democratic reformers who 
would like to see a foot-voting mechanisms that could imitate ballot voting.  
Inter-jurisdictional competition has been a familiar theme in Chinese law and politics. During 
the Great Leap Forward from 1959 to 1961, over thirty million people died from starvation in 
part because provincial leaders competed for Chairman Mao’s favor by delivering ever-higher 
grain quotas to the central government.121 On the other hand, the Chinese economic miracle in 
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the past thirty-six years is also attributed to subnational leaders’ interjurisdictional competition, 
this time, to attract investment capital. These two different stories tell us that the voice to which 
local officials respond crucially affects the consequence of inter-jurisdictional competition. Our 
proposal endeavors to transform competitions for the favor of supreme leaders or capital 
investors into competitions for the favor of the Chinese people. This would not be the final step 
of China’s democratization, but it would nevertheless be a crucial step towards increasing local 
government accountability. Once local officials begin to solicit the “foot-votes” of migrants, they 
also will have incentives to promote internal procedures to protect those foot-voters’ investment.  
Such procedures might logically and eventually include ballots.  
The Chinese case also reveals the nuanced relationship between voice and exit. Just as we 
say exit is foot-voting, exit is voice in the most essential way. Scholars have sometimes assumed 
away the political mechanisms by which  exit converts into a plausible complement for voice. 
Neither foot-voting nor ballot-voting is a silver bullet to government accountability. As we show 
in the Chinese context, it requires proper examination of the size of local governments, the fiscal 
system, and the immigration system, among many other aspects of public law. Is democracy 
possible in China? We do not know: it depends on your definition of “democracy.”  But can 
government accountability in China be improved through household mobility?  Our answer is 
yes.  
 
 
	
